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The Minimalist Program in generative syntax has been the subject of much 
rancour, a good proportion of it stoked by Noam Chomsky’s suggestion that 
language may represent “a ‘perfect solution’ to minimal design specifica-
tions.” A particular flash point has been the application of Minimalist prin-
ciples to speculations about how language evolved in the human species. 
This paper argues that Minimalism is well supported as a plausible ap-
proach to language evolution. It is claimed that an assumption of minimal 
design specifications like that employed in MP syntax satisfies three key de-
siderata of evolutionary and general scientific plausibility: Physical Opti-
mism, Rational Optimism, and Darwin’s Problem. In support of this claim, 
the methodologies employed in MP to maximise parsimony are character-
ised through an analysis of recent theories in Minimalist syntax, and those 
methodologies are defended with reference to practices and arguments from 
evolutionary biology and other natural sciences.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is no point in using the word ‘impossible’ to describe something that has 
clearly happened.             (Douglas Adams) 
 
The Minimalist Program (henceforth, often referred to as Minimalism or simply 
MP) in generative syntax has been the subject of much rancour, a good propor-
tion of it stoked by Chomsky’s suggestion that “language design may really be 
optimal in some respects, approach[ing] a ‘perfect solution’ to minimal design 
specifications” (Chomsky, 2000a: 93). A particular flash point has been the appli-
cation of Minimalism to speculation about how language evolved in the human 
species, most prominently represented by the Merge-only hypothesis in genera-
tive syntax (Chomsky, 2000b) and the saltationalist claims often made in parallel 
(Hauser et al., 2002). To date, Anna Kinsella (Parker) has carried out the most ex-
tensive investigation into how well motivated Minimalism may be in relation to 
the evolution of human natural language syntax (Parker 2006; Kinsella, 2009, 
                                                
  I’d like to thank Kleanthes K. Grohmann for his guidance and generosity, and also three 
anonymous reviewers for their very helpful criticisms and comments. 
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2015; Kinsella & Marcus, 2009), undertaking to look at “what we know from evo-
lutionary biology about what typically evolving systems look like, what kinds of 
properties they have, and then applying this to questions about the plausible na-
ture of language” (Kinsella & Marcus, 2009: 187). The conclusion is a strongly 
dissenting one, claiming that a more suitable approach “may reverse this [Mini-
malist] trend, and look towards possible imperfections as a source of insight into 
the evolution and structure of natural language” (Kinsella & Marcus, 2009: 207). 
The vote of evolutionary plausibility, it is claimed, counts against Minimalism.  
 This paper presents the countering view that what we know about biologi-
cal design—and the kinds scientific inference needed to explain it—substantiate 
Minimalism as a plausible evolutionary hypothesis. Towards this end, section 2 
makes some clarifications about the methodology and objectives of Minimalist 
syntax and introduces some technical language for discussing the virtues of 
Minimalism as a metric of evolutionary plausibility. In sections 3 and 4, I charac-
terise the methodologies employed in MP through an analysis which exemplifies 
the use of redundancy, economy, and efficiency in Minimalist syntax. Building 
on this characterisation, sections 5 and 6 mount a defence of those methodologies 
with reference to practices and arguments drawn from contemporary evolution-
ary biology and neighbouring natural sciences.  
 
 
2. Optimality and Evolution  
 
2.1. ‘The Best of All Possible Language Faculties’ 
 
In the following passage, Kinsella and Marcus lay out an argument against the 
Minimalist conception of language evolution.  
 
[A]t least one strand of recent linguistics—its tendency towards a presumption of 
perfection—is at odds with two core facts: The fact that language evolved quite re-
cently (relative to most other aspects of biology) and the fact that even with long 
periods of time, biological solutions are not always maximally elegant or efficient. 
To our minds, anyway, the presumption of perfection in language seems unwar-
ranted and implausible […].       (Marcus & Kinsella, 2009: 207) 
 
A plausible account of language evolution, they claim, leaves scant margin for 
optimal design. They consider the following metrics against which one could as-
sess this claim: 
 
Language might be considered optimal if communication between speaker and 
hearer were as efficient as possible. […] Another possible measure of optimality 
might be in terms of the amount of code that needs to be transmitted between 
speaker and hearer for a given message that is to be transmitted. [… C]ould lan-
guage be a system that yields an optimal balance between ease of comprehension 
and ease of acquisition?        (Kinsella & Marcus, 2009: 196) 
 
 It is clear from these speculations that the notion of perfection under con-
sideration takes optimal communication to be the relevant metric. A casual exam-
ination of the range of biological traits provides prima facie confirmation of Kin-
sella & Marcus’ (2009) scepticism: The biological world is teeming with messy, 
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unlikely solutions to environmental pressures, an observation which undergirds 
Kinsella and Marcus’ well-founded conviction that language qua communicative 
system is more akin to Rube Goldberg machine—or a ‘Kluge’ in Marcus’ (2009) 
terms—than a precision-engineered device.  
 The Minimalist conception of optimal design, however, is fundamentally 
different insofar that the faculty of language (FL) is not a communicative sys-
tem—or a ‘functional’ system of any kind—but rather FL is a theory of a physical 
object. A more appropriate comparison is Turing’s well-known study of mor-
phogenesis which explains biological design by appealing to necessary interac-
tions of matter—what neurobiologists Reeve & Sherman (2001: 64f.) referred to as 
“the surprisingly ordered of simple underlying processes”. Optimality in the 
functional sense is quite distinct to optimality in the latter, developmental sense. 
There is no contradiction, for instance, in the design of zebra stripes being sub-
optimal with respect to its function as camouflage yet also highly optimal as a 
solution to the developmental (i.e. biochemical) gully that must be breached to 
bring about this evolutionary novelty. The question of interest to Minimalists is 
to “what extent language is a ‘good solution’” to the conditions imposed by other 
cognitive systems with which language interacts (Chomsky, 2000a: 9). This latter 
conjecture is in keeping with the Minimalist hypothesis that much of human lan-
guage design can be explained by the introduction of a hierarchical form of struc-
ture to an existing “conceptual-intentional” cognitive system (roughly, the fac-
ulty of thought) and its externalisation through a sensori-motor system (roughly, 
the capacity for producing sound); which is to say, syntax is for thought in the 
sense that its structure was largely determined by the constraints of a pre-
existing conceptual-intentional cognitive faculty. 
 In the context of language evolution, then, optimality is a causal hypothesis 
about how our changing biology has structured cognitive systems with respect to 
one another, and not a normative claim about the adaptive value of cognitive 
traits. The statement “even with long periods of time, biological solutions are not 
always maximally elegant or efficient” thus represents a departure both from the 
Minimalist conception of FL as an instance of biological design and from the 
Minimalist conception of optimality as a causal rather than normative (adaptive 
or functional) metric.1 This latter notion of optimality recalls the Leibnizian form 
of optimism proffered by computational neuroscientist Cherniak to describe the 
maximally efficient component placement that characterises the human brain: the 
human language faculty represents the “best of all possible language faculties” 
(quoted in Chomsky, 2005: 6, Cherniak’s actual phrase is “the best of all possible 
brains” 1995: 522; see also section 6 below). Kinsella & Marcus’ (2009) criticisms 
on the basis of the communicative efficacy of language thus rebut a misconstrued 
version of the Minimalist conception of optimality. 
 
                                                
    1 Kinsella does briefly give a more accurate portrayal of Minimalist desiderata in other places. 
For instance, she and Marcus argue that “it is unrealistic to expect language to be a perfect 
or near-perfect solution to the problem of mapping sound and meaning, and equally un-
realistic to expect that all of language’s properties can be derived straightforwardly from 
virtual conceptual necessity” (Kinsella & Marcus, 2009: 203). 
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2.2. Darwin’s Problem and Parsimony 
 
The question immediately posed when adopting this understanding of opti-
mality is: What makes one theory of Narrow Syntax more optimal than any other 
theory?2 A simple gloss to the Minimalist conception of optimality is what phi-
losophers of science have taken to calling ‘parsimony’ (Popper, 1959; Simon, 
1969; Kitcher, 1976; Sober, 2015)—the kind of simplicity and elegance that is typi-
cal of good scientific theories in all of the natural sciences. One aspect of parsi-
mony which has arisen in the context of language is what has dubbed ‘Darwin’s 
Problem’ (Boeckx, 2009: 45): Postulating a large number of events resulting in FL 
is almost certainly inappropriate given the short space of time available and 
Darwin’s Problem therefore militates for a saltationalist account of language; in 
other words, an account in which the novel language phenotype emerged rapidly 
with only a few evolutionary events. 
 
2.3. Three ‘Optimalities’ 
 
With these clarifications in mind, it will be useful to introduce some terminology 
for understanding how the different claims of linguists, cognitive neuroscientists, 
and evolutionary biologists can fit together to form a clearer picture of what 
Minimalism could mean as a theory of linguistic evolution. A well-established 
distinction in the Minimalist literature is that between methodological and sub-
stantive minimalism. The former, Chomsky notes, has a merely “heuristic and 
therapeutic value” (Chomsky, 2000b) for enquiry. It is methodological insofar 
that its motivation is not unique to linguistics—it is a general principle of sci-
ence—and in that it does not rely on any ancillary hypotheses about the structure 
of the world. Substantive minimalism, contrastively, is the extent to which the 
causal hypothesis outlined in section 2.1 above is true of language. An example 
of substantive minimalism which I will elaborate on below is the apparently per-
vasive phenomenon of ‘least effort’ principles in syntax. The conclusion to Dar-
win’s Problem reached by Minimalists, quite opposite to that reached by Kinsella 
& Marcus (2009), is that, because there is a great deal of phenotypic change to be 
explained in only a short span of evolutionary time, it must be assumed that 
something “comes for free”, or is given a priori, to explain the dramatic variation. 
There is an obvious analogy here between the form of Darwin’s Problem and that 
of the wellspring of generative metatheory, the poverty of the stimulus argument 
(or ‘Plato’s Problem’): The structure of FL is underdetermined by the environment, 
similar to the circumstance encountered by the child learner, because of the insuf-
ficient time and environmental resources available to ensure the correct final 
state emerges. 
                                                
    2 Narrow Syntax represents one half of the distinction made in Hauser et al. (2002) between 
the faculty of language broadly conceived, and the faculty of language narrowly conceived. 
The former denotes every aspect of FL which is sufficient for human language—the presence 
of a tongue, the ability to distinguish sounds of the appropriate length and quality, and so 
on. The latter is a subset of the first, denoting only the aspects of FL which are uniquely ne-
cessary for language. That is to say, Narrow Syntax is the computational system which dif-
ferentiates human language from other linguistic traits common to non-linguistic (and 
therefore also non-human) forms of cognition. 
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 The methodological and substantive motivations for Minimalism are 
equally important to the enterprise and converge on similar theoretical objec-
tives. Crucially, however, the two are different in their justifications. It must be 
recognised that the optimality of the physical/biological object ‘language’ is a dis-
tinct proposition to the optimality of the formalisms making up the theory of the 
physical/biological object ‘language’ and that this in turn is a distinct proposition 
to the simplicity of the causal-historical sequence of events which resulted in the de-
sign of language. Though related, these are each distinct propositions that pertain 
to different kinds of scientific inference. The first of these propositions is a claim 
about the organisation of a physical structure in the world—the question is 
whether or not nature is capable of producing (structurally) optimal biological 
traits. We may call this doctrine Physical Optimism. A second prong of parsimony, 
which we can contrastively dub Rationalist Optimism, contends that redundancy 
is undesirable in theories on epistemological rather than purely empirical 
grounds. We may designate as Rational Optimism any supra-empirical principle 
of scientific theory selection that is not an ontological commitment about the na-
ture of the physical world.3 The last of these propositions, constituting a resolu-
tion to Darwin’s Problem, will henceforth be referred to as Causal–Historical Op-
timism. 
 We can distinguish, then, three justifications for parsimony which may fig-
ure into the plausibility of an evolutionary account of language design: Rational 
Optimism, Physical Optimism, and Causal–Historical Optimism. It must be 
noted that the three are not entirely independent; a physically optimal language 
faculty (the biological object) obviously increases the plausibility of a saltationist 
approach to Causal–Historical Optimism because a physically optimal language 
faculty is easier for evolution to reach. Similarly, a parsimonious biological object 
will naturally lend itself to the existence of a n optimal theory of language. These 
connections are explored further in section 5 and section 6 below. 
 
 
3. The Explananda of Minimalism 
 
3.1. Parsimony and ‘Principled Explanation’ 
 
In addition to establishing that parsimony is a virtue for explaining language de-
sign, it must also be shown that MP is in fact a parsimonious theory in the ap-
propriate ways. Here it is important to accurately characterise the methodology 
and objectives of syntactic Minimalism. One of the main objectives established in 
the Minimalist literature is the need to provide a ‘principled’ explanation for the 
properties of language with the corollary that any theoretical posits which are not 
principled ought to be considered suspect. A property of language, according to 
                                                
    3 Bar for a single perfunctory (though, strangely, not wholly dismissive) mention of this epis-
temological aspect of scientific parsimony, Kinsella and Marcus never satisfactorily address 
its significance: “In one respect, this notion [of parsimony in syntax] is admirable (if unsur-
prising): Linguistic theorizing, like all scientific theorizing, should be guided by consider-
ations of parsimony” (Kinsella & Marcus, 2009: 199). 
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Chomsky, can be considered principled insofar that it “can be reduced to [1] the 
third factor and to [2] conditions that language must meet to be usable at all” 
(Chomsky, 2005: 10; numerical annotations mine).  
 The ‘third factor’ is a somewhat enigmatic reference to elements of what 
Cherniak and others have termed non-genomic nativism—that is, aspects of bio-
logical design which follow from geometrical and computational necessities and 
are thus neither inherited nor acquired.4 The second element of principled ex-
planation, “virtual conceptual necessity”, refers simply to the virtue of building 
theories from first principles and abandoning unnecessary theoretical machinery. 
The boldest formulation of Minimalist syntax, the so-called Strong Minimalist 
Thesis, is based on the hypothesis that FL minimally satisfies the requirements of 
(1) the third factor and (2) virtual conceptual necessity. The task of Minimalist 
syntax, then, is to determine which elements of the theory are minimally satisfy-
ing—that is, which are necessary—and to achieve as much empirical coverage of 
the relevant facts of language as possible using only these elements plus those 
which can reasonably be derived from the third factor.  
 In practice there are three basic categories of parsimony used in MP. The 
first implores us to make maximal use of existing explanatory technology to ex-
plain facts. The motivation here is clear enough—the reduction of explanatory 
redundancy is the salient virtue. The second strategy is to use the minimal tech-
nology necessary to explain the requisite facts, what we may call the economy of 
explanatory technology. The first two of these are two sides of the same coin 
which I will call unification for obvious enough reasons. The third maxim is to 
assume a general condition of computational efficiency in computation. Below I 
introduce three simple and fairly uncontroversial syntactic explananda—discrete 
infinity, displacement, and binding theory—and in section 4, I demonstrate how 
MP applies the desiderata of redundancy, economy, and efficiency to derive a 
more parsimonious theory of these explananda. 
 
3.2. Discrete Infinity 
 
One of the earliest discoveries pertaining to the formal properties of human natu-
ral languages was that they do not belong to the class of regular languages which 
can be generated by a finite-state machine (Chomsky, 1956, 1959). A finite-state 
machine is an abstract formal device, essentially a more restricted Turing ma-
chine, which consists of an input, a set of states, and a set of rules for changing 
state based on the input. Finite-state machines generate only a subset of the pos-
sible languages; more powerful abstract devices, which differ principally in their 
capacity to ‘remember’ strings from the input, are required to generate the full set 
of possible languages, including human natural languages. As an illustrative 
point, Berwick et al. (2011) have shown that the song of Bengalese finches can be 
generated by a finite-state machine and consequently belongs to the class of regu-
                                                
    4 An example I will elaborate on in section 6 is the structure of neural arbors which are opti-
mally spatially arranged, not because of a process of adaptive design, but because of a geo-
metrical necessity shared by physical phenomena of numerous scales and origins—
branching rivers, crystalline structures, and so on.  
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lar languages. Finch song conforms to this pattern as it contains sequences of 
notes repeated and reused throughout the duration of the song, but never reuses 
these sequences inside other sequences (Berwick et al., 2011: 115; see Figure 1).  
 A finite-state grammar without dependencies can be represented as: 
 
anbm 
 
 What Chomsky showed in the mid-1950s is that, unlike finch song, human 
language (or, really, the English language) belongs to a larger set of languages 
that can contain dependencies. Unlike finite-state grammars, the dependencies 
contained in human languages require the ability to shift the value of a string 
onto a ‘stack’ while a second string is being processed and recall it at a later 
point. This capacity for memory is captured by the formalism of a push-down 
stack automaton.5 What this means is that a valid string can be, for instance, a 
sequence of as followed by the same number of bs, a string which is mirrored 
(aaabbb-bbbaaa), repeats itself (aaabbb-aaabbb), and so on, as represented in the fol-
lowing abstract grammar: 
 
anbn 
 
 This fact is evident in English when sentences are of the kind ‘If S1, then S2’. 
Strings of this type cannot be generated by finite-state machines because a string 
in S1 may depend on a string arbitrarily distant to it. In the string in (1), for in-
stance, the verb in S2 must agree in number with the subject of S1.  
 
(1) If [S1 the boya gets the girl] then [S2 he isa happy] 
 
The resulting dependency looks like ‘a1b2 … b2a1,’ a subset of those generated by a 
context-free grammar.  
 This basic characteristic has returned to prominence in recent discourse 
framed as discrete infinity. Discrete infinity, the Minimalist claim goes, marks a 
sui generis property of human cognition insofar that the capacity to generate hier-
archically arranged combinations of discrete units constitutes a larger subset of 
the set of possible languages than any organisation of the discrete units alone 
could produce. Human language is thus formally distinct to the communication 
systems of other species.  
 
                                                
    5 Grammars which can remember more than one value—taking the form anbncn—are context-
sensitive. There is some evidence that human languages are mildly context-sensitive, for in-
stance in ‘such that’-sentences (Higginbotham, 1984): 
 
(i) The girla such that the dog ran from herb to himc sat down on the bench. 
 
Whether context-sensitivity is a substantive aspect of linguistic cognition or merely an 
artefact of domain general processing is unclear. 
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Figure 1:  Formal properties of human and non-human language. Left: The Chomsky hierarchy; 
each category of languages is a subset of those generable by the larger set. Top right: A finite-state 
grammar of the Bengalese finch. Letters indicate song notes and numbers indicate probabilistic 
state transitions (Berwick et al., 2011: 117). Bottom right: phrase structure rules and a sentence in 
a dependency grammar.  
 
3.3. Displacement 
 
A second phenomenon unique to human languages is that lexical items are often 
interpreted semantically in a position different from that of their phonological 
expression. This displacement effect is readily discernible in what have tradition-
ally been considered to be the product of transformations in a covert (i.e. phono-
logically unpronounced) level of syntax—D(eep)-structure in Chomsky (1981). 
As an example of displacement, consider the sentences in (2) and (3): 
 
(2) Children hate broccoli. 
 
Semantically, this sentence states: 
 
(2')  Gen x (child (x): hates broccoli (x)) 
 
Or “Typically, for xs such that x is a child, x hates broccoli”. When a question is 
formed from this proposition we get: 
 
(3) What do children hate t?  
 
The semantic proposition expressed by the sentence is “For what x is it the case 
that children hate x?”. In this case, the unknown element x does not appear adja-
cent to the verb hate, as broccoli does in (1), but rather it appears adjacent to do in 
the form of the pronoun what. Our semantic interpretation is nonetheless that 
children hate x, as indicated by the paraphrase “Children hate what?” Displace-
ment, then, is the idea that elements like what are interpreted twice—in this case, 
once as a subject of the verb do and again as the object of the verb hate. 
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3.4. Binding Theory  
 
The final explanandum to be treated here is binding theory, which aims to ex-
plain the distribution of co-indexed nominals. The basic data are shown below:  
 
(4) [Mary’s father]i hated himselfi. 
(4')   * [Maryi’s father] hated herselfi. 
 
(5) Johni saw himj. 
(5')   * Johni saw himi. 
 
(6) Janei saw Janej. 
(6')   * Janei saw Janei. 
 
The sentence pair in (4) shows that the reflexive anaphor him-/herself may not be 
co-indexed with antecedent inside a genitive phrase. Similar relationships hold 
for (5)–(6) where the co-indexed nominals and possible interpretations of index-
ation are strictly limited in grammaticality. The key insights are that the distribu-
tion of co-referring nominals is closely related to (i) the locality of an antecedent 
and (ii) the antecedent being c-commanded by the element with which it is co-
indexed.  
 Locality here refers to the notion of belonging to the same ‘domain’ where 
a domain may be constituted by a phrase boundary. C-command determines the 
relationship between the antecedent and the anaphor (see the simplified tree 
structures in Figure 2). In (7), for instance, John is both co-indexed with and c-
commands the reflexive anaphor himself, but the unacceptability of (7) is a result 
of the reflexive not being ‘local enough’ to its antecedent. 
 
(7)    * [β Johni thinks [α that Mary saw himselfi]] 
 
That is, because β—and not α—is the binding domain of John, himself is not 
bound in its domain and ought to take a pronominal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  The binding domain and c-command. (a) John c-commands and is co-indexed with him-
self, but the domain of John is β, not α. (b) α c-commands β when the phrase containing α—XP in 
the above tree—contains β or any phrase containing β. 
a) b) 
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3.5. Summary 
 
The picture of FL suggested by the above—though far from factually or histori-
cally complete—is one of several highly distinct formalisms explaining what ap-
pear to be quite heterogenous axiomatic systems. Prima facie, this heterogeneity 
suggests that there must be numerous historical-causal events, each responsible 
for the distinct formal properties of language. In the section to follow, the MP 
practices of redundancy, economy, and efficiency will be demonstrated with re-
spect to four of these systems: phrase structure rules, transformations, c-
command, and the notion of a binding domain. 
 
 
4. Minimising Syntax 
 
4.1. The Objectives of Minimalism 
 
The Minimalist conjecture is that at least some of these formalisms must be el-
iminated if an evolutionarily plausible account of FL is to be given. This section 
exemplifies the methodologies of redundancy, economy, and efficiency as they 
are applied to reaching the goal of a plausible FL. The aim is to articulate the kind 
of desiderata Minimalism employs in accounting for the above linguistic facts in 
a maximally parsimonious way. 
 
4.2. The Merge-Only Hypothesis 
 
The strongest, and possibly most controversial, theory to have emerged from MP 
is the Merge-only hypothesis which proposes that Narrow Syntax is constituted 
by a single computational operation, MERGE.6 This conjecture is made on the 
grounds that MERGE is a virtually necessary component of any computational 
system which can generate a non-finite set of strings (i.e. a system capable of 
producing an unbounded array of embedded strings); any computational oper-
ation responsible for the dependencies ubiquitous in human languages, the claim 
goes, will require an operation which embeds an object within another object and 
this operation can be abstractly described as MERGE. Thus, the significant claim of 
MP is that MERGE is conceptually necessary, not merely conceptually sufficient. 
The methodological tenet of redundancy requires that all other conceptual appara-
tuses in the theory should be considered suspect, and the methodological tenet of 
economy requires that this virtually necessary component should be employed for 
maximal explanatory coverage. The Merge-only hypothesis is a clear demonstra-
tion of a unification which achieves both a reduction in redundancy and a maxi-
mal use of economy. MP is largely an exercise is making maximal use of MERGE, 
as well as some efficiency assumptions which are attributed—enigmatically, as it 
stands—to the third factor, again in line with the definition of principled explan-
ation given in section 2.  
                                                
    6 As an anonymous reviewer points out, Merge-only is something of a misnomer if Merge 
alone is not capable of satisfying the legibility conditions of the sensori-motor and concep-
tual-intentional systems. The role of interface conditions is more central in recent Minimalist 
proposals. 
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 Chomsky (2000b) presents a theory of MERGE which accounts for both the 
unbounded character described in section 2.1 and the displacement effect de-
scribed in section 2.2. However embedding is achieved, the Minimalist claim 
goes, that operation must resemble the abstract computation MERGE such that: 
 
MERGE(α, β) → K = {α, β} 
 
Where α and β are lexical items drawn from the lexicon and K is a new syntactic 
unit formed by applying MERGE to α and β. This new complex syntactic object K 
can then be MERGED with another syntactic object, so that: 
 
MERGE(γ, K) → { γ {α, β}} 
 
 Unlike finite-state grammars, in a grammar of this kind the new objects can 
grow in length to become complex strings, which in turn can be MERGED with 
other complex strings. Returning to (1), reprinted here as (8): 
 
(8)  If [S1the boy gets the girl] then [S2he is happy]  
 
In terms of the abstract formal characteristics of human languages, sentences like 
(1)—with the dependency structure ‘a1b2 … b2a1’—can be accounted for because 
the values of complex strings like S1 and S2 can be ‘remembered’ as a complex, 
merged whole as captured by the push-down stack formalism employed by Ber-
wick et al. (2011: 120). 
 
4.3. The Copy Theory of Movement 
 
Recall that displacement involves a lexical item interpreted in two positions as 
shown in (2) and (3), reprinted here as (9) and (10).  
 
(9) Children hate broccoli. 
 “For x, xs hate broccoli.”  
 
(10) What do children hate t? 
 “For what y, xs hate y.” 
 
The mystery is that, in the second sentence, the semantic interpretation of y ap-
pears to occur in both object and sentence initial position. A natural exposition 
may claim that an operation is acting on y, shifting it upwards. Call this second 
operation MOVE. This would account for displacement, but at the cost of the ad-
ditional stipulation of a second operation. The account in Chomsky (2000b) for-
wards an argument to the effect that MERGE can account for the same explananda 
as MOVE and is thus methodologically preferable. This unification is possible, he 
claims, if it is assumed that MERGE can apply both to new objects drawn from the 
lexicon, as outlined above, but also to objects already inside the merged syntactic 
object.  
 This latter version of MERGE operates in the following way:  
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MERGE(α, K) → {α { γ {α, β}}} 
 
That is, MERGE calls the object α which is already merged within the object {γ {α, 
β}} thus making α the new head of the object {α {γ {α, β}}}.We can distinguish EX-
TERNAL MERGE, where the two objects MERGED are different, from this operation 
of INTERNAL MERGE, where one of the objects MERGED is internal to the complex 
object. If one of the internally merged objects is not phonologically pronounced, 
this will give the appearance of α having ‘moved,’ as indicated in Figure 3. This is 
sometimes referred to as the copy theory of movement. As outlined in Chomsky 
(2007), ‘copy’ is a façon de parler and not a bona fide operation; the two identical 
instances of α results simply from MERGE applying internally in line with the 
most economic principle, namely that neither object is altered by the operation of 
MERGE (the so-called ‘No Tampering Condition’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  The copy theory of movement. Displacement and discrete infinity can be explained with 
a single unified theory if we assume that MERGE can apply to objects within the syntactic struc-
ture. 
 
 The copy theory of movement is an example of unifying parsimony in that 
two conceptual technologies (MOVE and MERGE) have been subsumed under a 
single, more encompassing one, thus eliminating redundancy. 
 
4.4. C-Command and INTERNAL MERGE 
 
An attempt to account for the technological complications of c-command and 
minimal domain which exemplifies the Minimalist method is that of Hornstein 
(2001).7 Recall the breakdown of binding theory in section 2 above, particularly 
that the distribution requires that (i) the locality of an antecedent and (ii) the ante-
cedent being c-commanded by a co-indexed element. The two key technologies 
which must be explained are thus the notion of a ‘domain’ and the formal notion 
of c-command. Hornstein (2001) claims that the copy theory of movement makes 
sense of binding without these ‘messy’ stipulations: 
 
                                                
    7 As an anonymous reviewer points out, Hornstein’s proposals importantly rely on the exist-
ence of the operations Move and Copy—for instance, to account for Improper Movement 
restrictions. I’ve overlooked these inconsistencies here, as they go well beyond the scope of 
this paper, and continued the discussion in terms of the copy theory of movement. 
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[The Minimalist Program] already has a notion of local domain, i.e., ‘minimal do-
main,’ as part of its theory of movement. […] Standard considerations of theoreti-
cal parsimony would favor eliminating one of these locality notions. 
(Hornstein, 2001: 153) 
 
 For instance, if INTERNAL MERGE is applied to an element α of an XP, the 
following will result: 
 
    MERGE(α), [XP β [α …] … ] 
 
         → 
 
     [XP α [XP β [ α … ] … ] … ] 
 
Figure 4:  α1 will c-command α2 as a result of INTERNAL MERGE.  
 
In the copy theory, the higher α will form a ‘chain’ (in GB parlance; see Chomsky, 
1981) with the lower α simply because they are the same element copied via IN-
TERNAL MERGE. The c-command relation emerges from the requirement that α 
attach to the root node purely because any element MERGING with an internal 
element will be dominated by a phrase dominating the internal element (see Fig-
ure 4) and the economy condition Shortest Move is capable of explaining the re-
quirement for locality. This is because, for example, in (11) MERGING John to sen-
tence initial position would violate it.  
 
(11)   *[βJohni thinks [αthat Mary saw himselfi]] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Shortest Move can account for the local domain of binding theory.  
 
 Hence, Hornstein’s approach to binding is an exemplification of how the 
requirements of binding theory can be met with a Minimalist methodology em-
ploying no greater technological complication than MERGE and Shortest Move. 
 
4.5. Summary  
 
Efficiency conditions are not motivated in the same way MERGE is—it is not a 
conceptual necessity that language is computationally efficient. Proceeding from 
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the virtual conceptual necessity of MERGE, MP unifies the theoretical machinery 
of three distinct formal systems under this single mechanism. Discrete infinity, 
displacement, and c-command—probably the most formally conspicuous aspects 
of human natural language syntax—can be accounted in a near maximally uni-
fied theory of syntax. The additional of Shortest Move further derives a local do-
main restraint which has applications in many areas of syntax and is exemplary 
of the use of efficiency. The dictum of efficiency can therefore still make a claim 
to being parsimonious if it can unify numerous heterogeneous conceptual tech-
nologies under a single mechanism. 
 
 
5. Rational Optimism 
 
5.1. Two Justifications for Rational Optimism 
 
Rational Optimism represents an epistemologically motivated justification for par-
simony based on the conjecture that simpler theories are ipso facto more likely to 
be true theories. Contrary to Kinsella, an evolutionary story with fewer muta-
tions is in fitting with evolutionary biological practice. One candidate is a proba-
bilistic or ‘frequentist’ approach to causal inference which validates the intuitive 
assumption that a single common cause of two events is more plausible than 
multiple independent causes. The frequentist interpretation of parsimony lends 
itself particularly well to the saltationist hypothesis for language since it is part of 
the central methodology of cladistics, the science of evolutionary history. A sec-
ond approach differs from the first in that it takes as its focus the possibility of 
error in scientific models rather than the likelihood of causes. This is a strong 
justification of unification as a methodology and is routinely used in the natural 
sciences to reduce the level of error in modelling by estimating the ‘overfit’ of a 
theory with respect to an impoverished data set. Both of these justifications, if 
correct, constitute a supra-empirical principle of parsimony that support MP’s 
methodology and hypotheses.  
 
5.2. Likelihood and Parsimony  
 
Let’s proceed with the first, frequentist, interpretation of plausibility and evalu-
ate its utility to the notion of parsimony as it pertains to language evolution. An 
example of how parsimony may increase likelihood, taken from Sober’s (1988) 
discussion of Reichenbach, can get us on our way.  
 Given a pair of correlated facts—say, both my and my neighbour’s car 
doors being scratched—a simple explanation for the pair may be that my neigh-
bour has dinged my car door with his or her own car door thus causing the dam-
age to both door simultaneously. Call this hypothesis E1. A more complex ex-
planation, requiring the postulation of more agents and causes, is that a third 
neighbour dinged both of our car doors independently. Call this E2. 
 
(E1) Neighbour 1 damages both his/her car door and my car door at the same time.  
(E2) Neighbour 2 damages Neighbour 1’s door and my door in two separate incidents.  
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Assume both neighbours have an equal probability of damaging my car door—
they will each do so around once a year, giving them each an approximately 0.3% 
probability of having damaged my car door on any particular day this year—and 
that instances of car door damage nearly always result in both doors being dam-
aged—about 90% of the time. E1, as well as being simpler, confers a much higher 
likelihood on the outcome.8 
 
5.2.1. Conjunctive Forks 
 
Following the logic of Sober’s discussion of the notion of a ‘conjunctive fork,’ as 
formulated by Reichenbach (1956), we can get some initial purchase on why like-
lihood improves with parsimony. We may say that a correlation between events 
is probabilistically dependent when one conspicuously co-occurs with another. A 
correlation occurs, then, in the case that: 
 
Pr(A1 𝄅 A2) > Pr(A1) x Pr(A2)  
 
Which is to say, correlation occurs when the observed probability of two 
events—A1 and A2—occurring together is greater than the observed probability of 
them occurring independently. Having knowledge of A1 therefore gives us 
probabilistic knowledge of A2 which the probabilities of each event alone would 
not reveal. In the above case of the damaged car door, there is a very high proba-
bility of damage being caused to both doors involved. Call this probability T. It 
was also the case that the cars in question were neighbours, so when the proba-
bility of damage is present for A1 it is also present for A2. Call this assumption C.  
 The interesting fact which Reichenbach noted is that if causal hypothesis E1 
is assumed then the presence or absence of T under the assumption of C is suffi-
cient for us to estimate the probability of both doors being damaged. It is no 
longer necessary to posit the dependence of one event on the other because 
knowing the probability of damage and the fact that the two agents are neigh-
bours explains the correlation. If we posit a joint cause of A1 and A2 in this way, 
Reichenbach claims, we have a conjunctive fork: A postulated cause which ren-
ders the probabilities of two correlated events independent. What we have de-
scribed here, then, is a way of understanding why postulating common causes—
that is, postulating fewer causes—leads to better explanations. This ‘Principle of 
the Common Cause’ claims that positing fewer causes for the same net effect will, 
ceteris paribus, deliver a better explanation. 
 
5.2.2 The Principle of the Common Cause and Cladistic Parsimony  
 
Sober provides a succinct example of the utility of parsimony to historical infer-
ence which will make the association clearer. Sober has in a mind a particular 
                                                
    8 We can see how this is so arithmetically by attending to the probabilities of E1 and E2 respec-
tively. The probability of one neighbour damaging my door, plus the probability that both 
doors will have evidence of having being damaged is Pr(.003)(.9). The probability of E1 is 
therefore greater than the probability that Neighbour 1 and my car doors will have each 
been damaged by Neighbour 2 independently, which is Pr(.003)(.003). 
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problem of historical inference, namely the principle of cladistic parsimony. As 
the name suggests, cladistic parsimony the similarities between species is best 
explained by positing common ancestry wherever possible. This precept has an 
inverse: As well as maximising the number of posited common derived charac-
ters,9 we should minimise the number of posited homoplasies—parallel, or con-
vergent, similarities which have evolved independently. 
 This virtue can be demonstrated by taking a simple case like that in Fig. 6, 
where each branch—A, B, and C—represents a species.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Cladistic parsimony. Two possible ancestries (bottom) for a set of characters (in table, 
above). Adapted from (Sober, 1988: 30). 
 
Faced with the problem of reconstructing the ancestry of a character will mean 
deciding whether any two of A, B, and C have a common ancestor which the 
other lacks. The only evidence available to us is the presence or absence of vari-
ous characters, as represented in the table at the top of the figure and we further 
assume that all three species have at least one common ancestor. The problem 
here is that, while positing the ancestry depicted in the figure on the left perfectly 
explains the distribution of characters 1–45 and 46–50, we must then assume that 
B and C each evolved character 51 independently. By contrast, the ancestry de-
picted in the figure on the right explains the homology in characters 1–45 and 51, 
but we must assume that A and B each independently evolved characters 46–50. 
According to cladistic parsimony, the best theory of the historical ancestry of 
these characters is therefore (AB)C, as it posits the fewest homoplasies.  
                                                
    9 A tangential note on the terminology of cladistic analysis: What I have simply called a ‘de-
rived character’ (i.e., any non-zero character in the figure) is a vernacular term for an apo-
morphy. Any apomorphy which is inherited from a direct common ancestor (A and B in the 
figure on the left) is a synapomorphy. By extension, what I have called an ‘ancestral charac-
ter’ is a plesiomorphy (all zero-valued characters in the figure) which, when shared, become 
symplesiomorphies (B and C in the figure on the right). Since my discussion of cladistic par-
simony is less central than Sober’s, I stick with the less jargonistic ‘derived’ and ‘ancestral’ 
character, using ‘shared’ or ‘common’ to indicate homology. 
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 Increasing the resolution from many clades and their respective characters 
to a single species (Homo sapiens) and its characters should not alter the conclu-
sions drawn from Sober’s reasoning: If parsimony is generally a virtue in predict-
ing the causal-historical breakdown of phylogenies, it ought to be a virtue in pre-
dicting the causal-historical breakdown of phenotypes. We are justified, then, to 
assume that Rational Optimism provides a good rationale for inferring as few 
events as possible in the causal history of language evolution.10 
 
5.3. Parameters, Parsimony, and Plausibility  
 
A second supra-empirical principle of plausibility aims to reduce the number of 
assumptions or parameters a theory must entail Popper (1959) believed that pa-
rameters—or, rather, a paucity of them—were an important aspect of parsimony 
in the philosophy of science. For him, the nature of the question was exhausted 
by the ductility of a theory; that is, more brittle theories—those with fewer 
valued parameters—are more easily falsified than very ductile ones, which can 
be stretched this way and that in virtue of their many manipulable parameters: 
“The epistemological questions which arise in connection with the concept of 
simplicity,” he therefore claimed, “can all be answered if we equate this concept 
with degree of falsifiability” (Popper, 1959: 140; original emphasis) Popper’s is one 
understanding of how fewer parameters can aid a theory in achieving veridi-
cality, though a suitably positivist one. It is prototypical of Rational Optimism, 
however, in that no observation or observations could diminish its force; it is 
properly a priori. 
 
5.3.1. The Problem of ‘Over-Fitting’ 
 
The central idea of parameter parsimony is that fewer uncertain variables re-
duces the potential for error. The below figure presents a single set of data points 
for the two variables x and y and two polynomials which potentially describe the 
relationship between the points. 
                                                
    10 It does not follow from the likely paucity of past evolutionary events that language design is 
simple, or that the change which resulted in language design was simple. It does not follow 
because there are two circumstances under which a saltation can lead to a trait, each with 
different entailments for a parsimony-based metric of evolutionary plausibility.  
 
(i) A minor change in developmental chronology can lead to vast phenotypic changes. This 
requires only that the nature of the design in question is relatively easy to realise in 
physical media. 
(ii) A major change in developmental chronology can lead to a vast phenotypic change. This 
requires that all the correct developmental conditions to be in place prior to the saltation. 
 
The state of affairs described in (i), and not that in (ii), is the scenario hypothesised in 
MP but it remains that cladistic parsimony licenses no inferences about the causal-history 
and structure of language except that fewer mutation-events are preferable.  
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Figure 7:  An illustration of a curve-fitting problem. 
 
In (a), a simple linear regression is posited by a first-degree polynomial curve.11 
The nearly arbitrary straight line plot is clearly unsatisfactory, revealing nothing 
of interest about the relationship between x and y: A straight line can be drawn 
through any data and this will rarely yield any interesting analysis or further 
predictive accuracy.  
 The inverse of this point is that for any data (xi… xn), there is a n–1th de-
gree polynomial which plots a line perfectly through every x. We see this in (b), 
where every point is fitted exactly by the curve. Surprisingly, however, perfect 
performance on the input data will with extreme rarity translate into satisfactory 
predictive accuracy when the curve is extrapolated to a larger set of data. This 
problem affects all finite data sets (i.e., every possible data set), but is particularly 
troublesome for very small ones. It is known as the problem of ‘overfitting,’ 
where the theory incorporates experimental error and other forms of noise—such 
as sampling error—thus leading to an amplification of minor fluctuations in the 
data not relevant to the target phenomenon.  
 
5.3.2. The Akaike Information Criterion 
 
The Akaike Information Criterion is a method for predicting the degree of overfit 
for any given problem of inductive extrapolation. Sober argues that the Akaike 
Information Criterion provides a justification for (and metric for the degree of) 
unification in scientific inference. The difference between true curves and curves 
which contain error is estimable, according to the Akaike Information Criterion, 
because error is proportional to the parameters which can potentially deviate 
from the true curve. That is, we can estimate the degree to which higher-degree 
polynomial curves will overfit the data if we know the rate at which error in-
creases with each additional parameter. However, too few parameters—like a 
straight line—will obviously harm goodness-of-fit. The overfitting problem is 
thus a question of trade-off between parsimony and goodness-of-fit. The virtue of 
parsimony is, in this respect, inversely linked to the potential for error.12 
                                                
    11 The greater the degree of polynomial, the more complex the curve its expresses will be. The 
first-degree polynomial in (a) expresses a straight line, a second-degree polynomial will ex-
press a parabola, and so on. 
    12 Other matters of interest are how the trade-off is to be achieved and how it is to be justified. 
Call the true curve Ct and the one most accurate relative to the known data Ca. We can now 
ask how close Ct will be to Ca, or the overfit of Ca. As set out by Forster & Sober (1994), the 
 
. 
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5.4. Summary 
 
We may, with Sober and Forster’s imprimatur, think that the Akaike Criterion 
“provides a ready characterization of the circumstances in which a unified model 
is preferable to two disunified models that cover the same domain.” (Forster & 
Sober, 1994: 13) The Akaike Criterion therefore provides a robust rationale for the 
methodology of unifying technologies in MP by establishing a concrete link be-
tween the desire to minimise the number of parameters accounting for data in a 
theory, and to maximise the employment of existing parameters to achieve opti-
mal coverage. Unifications are, in essence, an exercise in minimising probable 
error. The frequentist interpretation of parsimony is similar in that it derives its 
power from a supra-empirical principle. It differs, however, in that it provides a 
justification for the saltationalist solution to Darwin’s Problem by demonstrating 
the intuitive virtue of evoking common causes for evolutionary characters.  
 
6. Physical Optimism 
 
6.1. Spontaneity, Efficiency, and Physical Optimism 
 
The guiding rationale of Rational Optimism is that simple science is better sci-
ence. A separate concern is the degree to which the biological world, and more 
particularly cognition, is typified by optimal design as defined by MP. Contrary 
to Kinsella & Marcus’ (2009) findings, evidence from the ‘extended synthesis’ of 
evolutionary biology, comparative ethology, and impressive new findings from 
dynamic neuroscience demonstrate saltationalism and computational optimality 
to be highly plausible outcomes of language evolution. The core idea is that even 
highly complex aspects of biological design are substantially constituted by “the 
surprisingly ordered systems of simple underlying processes” (Reeve & Sher-
man, 2001: 64f.) which emerge spontaneously and are explained by simple chan-
ges in the organisation of matter. A particular subset of these “self-organising” 
systems—what have been called neuro-oscillations—has been implicated in the 
processing of phrase-level speech signals (Ding et al., 2015).  
 This result may vindicate Minimalist hypotheses about the origins of syn-
tactic cognition: In light of these findings, it is highly plausible that the salient 
                                                                                                                                 
Akaike Information Criterion provides a method for estimating the overfit of Ca with respect 
to the number of variables in the polynomial expressing the curve. It does so by generalising 
to the family of curves to which Ct and Ca belong, respectively, rather than considering the 
specific curves themselves. Call the family of curves to which Ca belongs Fa and the likeli-
hood (in the technical sense) of the data given this family of curves L(Fa). Akaike’s Criterion 
states that the difference of Ca and Ct will be approximately equal to: 
 
(i) L(Fa)SS + 2k(σ2) 
 
In (i), k is the number of parameters in the polynomial expressing the family of curves, 
and SS—or the sum of squares—is a statistical method for finding the total variance from the 
mean (which therefore tracks goodness-of-fit). σ2 relates to the size of the data sampled and 
reflects the notion that overfit is linked to sampling error. Notice, then, that in the absence of 
error (σ2 = 0) the difference of Ca and Ct will just be the likelihood of Fa subject to SS. 
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aspects of language design emerged via what Benítez-Burraco (2014) has de-
scribed as a perturbation of the robust equilibrium of pre-anatomically modern 
human’s brain oscillatory rhythms. The emergence of human language can be 
seen through this lens as a perturbation of a highly conserved (evolutionarily an-
cient) self-organising system and a subsequent ‘tuning’ of the resulting system to 
result in a novel and robust phenotype. This is an appealing elaboration on the 
Minimalist story that provides “a better view of the genetic underpinnings of 
language and the molecular mechanisms that channel variation at all levels of 
analysis” (Benítez-Burraco, 2014: 1). 
 
6.2. Spontaneity, Invariance, and Darwin’s Problem 
 
The short span of evolutionary time available to account for linguistic knowledge 
requires not only that there are few evolutionary events responsible for language, 
but also that there is a possible alteration in the organisation of physical (brain-) 
matter capable of producing such a phenotype in only a few steps. This scenario 
becomes far more plausible if there are organisations of matter which do not just 
reach new states rapidly, but which are also ‘canalised’ insofar that they will 
reach the required end state from any of a wide range of initial states. Spontaneity 
and invariance are thus key desiderata of Physical Optimism with respect to Cau-
sal–Historical Optimism—and consequently a solution to Darwin’s Problem. 
Self-organising systems satisfy both of these desiderata; they emerge quickly and 
across a variety of environments. That is, the structure of some highly abstract 
organisations of physical matter are such that they will inexorably trend towards 
a state and then remain in that state indefinitely. Kauffman (1991) describes such 
stasis points as ‘attractors’ for this quality of inevitability. Stasis points are ex-
tremely robust in that they attain in a wide range of physical realisations, they 
emerge rapidly due to their ‘attracting’ capacity.13 
 Kauffman provides us with a simple example of self-organisation, which 
will get us on our way. “The approach begins,” Kauffman starts, “by idealizing 
the behavior of each element in [a] system […] as a simple binary (on or off) vari-
able” (Kauffman, 1991: 64). That is, we ignore all but the details necessary for the 
general design. The particulars of this system, a network of three communicating 
elements, are represented in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
    13 These kinds of explanations fall quite naturally out of a very attractive potential framework 
for explaining the emergence and physical realisation of language, an approach amenable to 
a style of evolutionary explanation dubbed ‘rational morphology’ by Kauffman. This ap-
proach follows a rich tradition of biological enquiry tracing its intellectual prehistory back-
wards from Turing’s (1952) analyses of morphogenesis, through Thompson’s (1917) laws of 
growth, back to the original rational morphologists who counted among their numbers 
Goethe and Cuvier. 
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Figure 8:  A self-organising network. A simple Boolean network (left) and table of possible states 
(right). Adapted from (Kauffman, 1991: 66). 
 
The figure on the left is a network of three elements, each conforming to a 
Boolean operator, and each interacting with the other two by sending and receiv-
ing signals reflecting their current state (active ‘1’ or inactive ‘0’). In this network, 
A functions as an AND operator, while B and C both function as OR operators. 
When both B and C are active, A will either remain or become active itself, de-
pending on whether it was active previously. B and C will remain or become ac-
tive if either of the other two elements are active. The table on the right describes 
all the (23 =) 8 starting permutations of the network and their respective successor 
states.  
 The important facts to notice are that in line L1, where all the states are in-
active, there is stasis. In lines two and three, where only one of either B or C is on, 
the network will cycle endlessly between those two states. In all other initial 
states (lines four to eight), A, B, and C, will all rapidly become active and the 
network will again be in stasis. A remarkable upshot of these new discoveries in 
the area of neuro-oscillations is that both of the empirically motivated desiderata 
of MP—Causal–Historical Optimism and Physical Optimism—are satisfied. The 
framework is, furthermore, an intuitive explanation for why human nature lan-
guage syntax has been so amenable to formalistic, axiom-based explanation. Self-
organising systems are ‘emergent’, meaning they arise when highly abstract pat-
terns of interacting matter result in a what Wagner (1989) calls an ‘epigenetic 
trap’: A robust equilibrium that is both attractive—matter in other states tends 
towards the equilibrium state—and invariant—matter of numerous scales is sus-
ceptible to the patter.  
 Consider, for instance, that  
 
1. Syntax is indivisible; there is no ‘half unboundedness.’ 
2. Syntax has the characteristic of being discrete in the sense that 
symbols and contrastive features are interpreted as independent 
units. 
3. Syntax is readily describable in geometric terms, suggesting that 
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there is something metaphysically necessary determining the 
structure of syntactic cognition.14 
4. Syntax exhibits the scale-invariance which is the most conspicuous 
feature of self-organising systems.  
 
These four characteristics are conspicuously “unbiological” (Block, 1995) and are 
strong reasons for suspecting that self-organisation is an appropriate form of evo-
lutionary explanation for human language. 
 
6.3. Homeostatic Rhythms and Cortical Entrainment  
 
Human natural language requires a form of hierarchical processing, which it has 
been hypothesised involves the Merging of syntactic objects of increasing size. 
This sort of scale invariance is a distinctive feature of self-organising systems, 
and lends itself naturally to the dynamical interpretation. That sanguinity has 
been known for decades: Conjecture about Fibonacci sequences is more or less de 
rigueur in considerations of evolution of language. The other reason for favouring 
a dynamical interpretation is more recent and inspires considerably more confi-
dence: EEG imaging has begun to provide strong evidence that the brain comes 
pre-equipped with a means for encoding multiply scalar dependencies. The basis 
of this progress is a deepened understanding of how homeostatic rhythms respond 
to input signals. The rhythms in question are the commonplace wave frequen-
cies—beta, delta, theta, etc.—which emerge from the excitation and discharge of 
cortical structures. What is novel is the discovery of how interference patterns 
among these frequencies encode information. Patterns interfere with one another 
in much the same way as people do: The loudest ones cause the most disruption.  
 Another way of thinking about interference is to consider the waves cre-
ated by displaced water from a pebble or the stern of a boat. Waves of greater 
magnitude—from heavier pebbles or faster boats—will consume ones of lesser 
magnitude. The same is true for brainwaves. A ‘louder’ wave with greater ampli-
tude influences ‘quieter’ ones. This becomes of great significance when the rela-
tionship between wave amplitude A and frequency f is plotted on a log scale. The 
result is a neat perfect line: A covaries almost perfectly with 1/fn. Neuroscientist 
György Buzsáki elaborates on why we should think this an important correla-
tion: 
 
[T]he inverse relationship between frequency and its power is an indication 
that there is a temporal relationship between frequencies: perturbations of 
slow frequencies cause a cascade of energy dissipation at all frequency 
scales. One may speculate that these interference dynamics are the essence of the 
global temporal organization of the cortex.    (Buzsáki, 2006: 119; emphasis mine)  
 
“Thus”, he claims a few pages later, “it should not come as a surprise that power 
(loudness) fluctuations of brain-generated and perceived sounds, like music and 
                                                
    14 This geometric character is particularly evident, for instance, in Kayne’s (1981) discussion of 
‘unambiguous paths’ in the binding of anaphora. 
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speech, and numerous other time-related behaviors exhibit 1/f power spectra” 
(Buzsáki, 2006: 123).15  
 There has been good confirmation of the hypothesis that cortical en-
trainment of theta band oscillation responds to linguistically relevant syllabic 
units, with phase patterns observed to discriminate between actual and non-
actual human natural language sentences (Ding et al., 2015). Poeppel’s lab has 
extended this significance to the phrasal level via precisely the mechanisms of 
rhythmic entrainment just described (Figure 9), showing that cortical responses 
closely track the temporal envelopes of phrase-level syntactic objects (Ding et al., 
2015: 4). The interaction of different frequencies at varying spatio-temporal scales 
depicted in the figure allows for hierarchical structure in signal processing.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Cortical entrainment of temporal envelopes. The table on the left depicts ten distinct 
oscillating frequencies in the mammalian brain (Buzsáki, 2006: 114). Top right is an illustration 
of low frequency delta waves overlaid by higher frequency theta and beta waves. The interaction of 
these different frequencies at varying spatio-temporal scales allows for hierarchical structure in 
signal processing (bottom right).  
 
What this suggests is that one sui generis property of human syntax—its capacity 
for hierarchical embedding—is a consequence of the power law holding between 
different rates of cortical oscillation.  
 These findings have recently been developed into concrete proposals for 
the recent evolutionary history of human syntactic cognition by Murphy (2015, 
2016a, 2016b) and Ramírez (2015) which provide a plausible explanation for sev-
eral syntactic phenomena (Murphy, 2015). Murphy (2016a) describes how the 
coupling of higher frequency gamma and lower frequency theta waves could 
provide a kind of “binding memory” that preserves the complex wholes of 
phrases.  
                                                
    15 This gradient has been known since the mid-nineteenth century. For instance, Weber’s 
Law—named for Ernst Weber (fl. 1830–40)—noted the basic configuration in the exponential 
ratio of ‘just noticeable’ perceptual characters to the strength of stimulus. Well-noted exam-
ples include the phenomenological experience of heaviness compared to an object’s actual 
weight, and the perceived versus actual change in illumination of a light source.  
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Figure 10:  An ‘oscillatory tree’ demonstrating the alignment of syntactic-level phrases with oscil-
latory frequencies (Murphy, 2016a).  
 
 An interesting corollary of this schema is that it may explain *XX (Boeckx, 
2013) and *{t,t} (Narita, 2015; in Murphy, 2015: 13), violations in which elements 
of the same category (e.g., NP, VP, CP) cannot occur adjacently.  
 
(12)   ∗	JohnNP MaryNP ate apples. 
 
(13)   ∗	[which picture of the wall]i do you think that [the cause of the riot]j was     
{ti,tj}?  
 
These patterns may occur, Murphy contends, because only a single binding from 
the high frequency gamma wave can be sustained at one time, adding further 
explanatory weight to the oscillatory framework.  
 
6.4. Efficiency and Energy-Minimisation  
 
What, though, could possibly justify the assumption of efficiency in linguistic 
computation, as required by Shortest Move? Moreover, even if such a rationale 
exists, why make the assumption that it is the case for language? An oft-discussed 
case of actual ‘in-the-world’ efficiency is that of Cherniak’s neural optimisation 
research. A good place to start is the irregularities which prompt Cherniak’s in-
terest. There are two: First, the quantity and internal angle of neuron ‘arbors’—
the branchings of dendritic cells (see Figure 11)—display a pattern characteristic 
of a diverse many natural systems—rivers, crystals, trees (actual ones, bark, 
leaves, etc.), inter alia. Second, neural components of numerous scale are organ-
ised so as to minimise the length of ‘wire’ (neural connective tissue) required for 
their interconnection. Each of these discoveries exhibits an unusual degree of op-
timisation, where optimisation is intended to denote a measure of efficiency ra-
ther than functionality. The first yields a ‘local’ form of optimisation, in that ar-
bors are optimal with respect to properties of individual cells. The second is a 
‘global’ form of optimisation which pertains to the whole network under con-
sideration.  
 The two distinct kinds of optimisation have different relevance. With re-
spect to local optimisation, our primary interest is in the mechanism of optimisa-
tion. The optimality in question in represented in Figure 11.  
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Figure 11:  Steiner tree problem and branching neural axon. See text for description. Bottom ad-
apted from (Cherniak et al., 1999: 6003). 
 
Above are an unsolved (top left) and a solved (top right) ‘Steiner tree’—a method 
of calculating the minimum distance (line length) required to connect a distribu-
tion of points. This pattern is evidenced in a number of natural domains in addi-
tion to neurons—blood vessels, lung bronchi, plant roots, coral formations, ant-
lers, rivers junctions, geological cracks, and lightening discharge patterns (Cher-
niak, 1992: 504). Below is an illustration of an actual dendritic arbor. The value of 
each internal angle θi and the number of branching axons bn is observed to be 
close to the optimal predicted by an appropriate Steiner tree.16 This, and the 
aforementioned examples, are all likely to be products of a simple ‘tug of war’ 
energy-minimization mechanism, similar to the formation of soap bubbles and 
snowflakes. In all these instances, competing pressures (opponents in the tug of 
war) fall into an equilibrium state with minimally expensive arc angles and quan-
tity. The significance of this mechanism is its easy congruence with the notion of 
self-organisation given above; efficiency and self-organisation are strange but 
happy bedfellows.  
 A second notion of optimality makes plain the relation to spontaneous 
order. The basic idea is similar the first, but now the metric of interest is compo-
nent placement: We can predict with surprising accuracy the organisation of (1) 
the brain relative to the body, (2) the functional regions of the brain relative to 
one another, and (3) the internal structure of functional components like nerve 
ganglia. This remarkably general coverage can be achieved by invoking a single, 
simple rule:  
                                                
    16 In fact, it is not close unless it is assumed—plausibly—that the task is to conserve the volume 
of connective tissue rather than length, and that the diameter of branches is less than that of 
trunks. Branches will consequently have a lower ‘cost’ per unit of length compared with 
trunks.  
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The adjacency rule: If two components a and b are connected, then a and b 
are adjacent. 
 
“The rule is a powerful predictor of the anatomy”, he claims, “a kind of ‘plate 
tectonics of the cortex’” (Cherniak, 1994a: 98). It predicts, for instance, that (a) 
and not (b) in Figure 12 will be the observed layout of three components. The 
most intuitive demonstration of the rule is the morphologically ubiquitous lo-
cation of the brain in the head, a fact Cherniak claims extends naturally from the 
surfeit of sensorimotor connections in the morphospace’s anterior instead of its 
posterior.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  Representation of a component placement problem. (a) requires greater wire-length 
than (b), where component placement is optimal with respect to the adjacency rule (Cherniak, 
1994a: 96). 
 
 Cherniak (1994a: 101) claims that “[a]n Occam’s Razor of the nervous sys-
tem, the simple logos ‘Save wire’ invokes a significant portion of the vast neuro-
wiring diagram”. It is fair to say, then, that this is no coincidence. Despite the 
extraordinary productiveness of the ‘save wire’ principle, neither Cherniak nor 
anyone else has a precise grip on what the perfect optimisation of component 
placement would be. This lack of understanding is not for lack of a concep-
tual appreciation of the task, but because of its intrinsic computational com-
plexity: Searches for optimal paths are prototypically NP-complete. This familiar 
refrain throws new light on the problem of component placement: 
 
To convey a sense of the computational intractability of exhaustive search 
for exact solution… it can be noted that the number of possible layouts of n 
components on n discrete positions (whether they form a one, two, or three-
dimensional array) is n! For merely the layout problem of the 50 main areas 
of the human cerebral cortex, there are 50! = 3.04 x 1064 alternative placement 
possibilities. The number of attoseconds (10–18 sec) in the 20 billion year his-
tory of the universe is 1035. Hence, if natural selection could test one layout 
per attosecond, all the time since dawn of the Universe, much less since em-
ergence of life on Earth, would not suffice for this exhaustive search. 
(Cherniak, 1994b: 2426) 
                                                
    17 We may wonder just how unusual the degree of observed optimisation is and consequently 
whether it could have been a product of mere chance. With respect to the global measure of 
optimisation, Cherniak estimates the null hypothesis of random component placement is 
improbable to a degree of certainty greater than p = 0.0001. 
a) b) 
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The optimality of component placement is the inverse of the ‘747 in a hurricane’ 
dilemma: We are forced by necessity into the assumption that nature has em-
ployed a means of spontaneous order. 
 
6.5. Summary  
 
These conclusions are, inevitably, speculative; inevitably because the very idea of 
evolutionary plausibility pushes at the boundaries of contemporary enquiry. Yet, 
it is uncontroversial in most scientific domains that parsimony is one of the de-
siderata which can be used to determine which is preferable of two or more com-
peting theories at a given level of organisation. The Principle of the Common 
Cause is sufficient to warrant the inference of parsimony with respect to the 
number of causes responsible for language design. A distinct motivation, but one 
no less important, is that the brittleness of a theory—its paucity of parameters for 
potential error—motivates a unification-based approach. These conceptions of 
‘Rational’ optimism apply not to a theory of causes implicated in the design of 
syntax, but, rather, to the theory of syntax which is the target of that explanation. 
Physical Optimism follows naturally from the characterisation of language as 
self-organising, and goes part of the way towards explaining how an independ-
ently motivated efficiency condition may be realised in physical media which we 
suspect is self-organising. The presumption of Physical Optimism also solves 
Darwin’s Problem by providing a plausible scenario in which spontaneous emer-
gence of order can overcome underdetermination. 
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